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Abstract
In Portugal, the telecommunications incumbent offers broadband access to the Inter-
net, both through digital subscriber line and cable modem. In this article, we estimate
the impact on broadband access to the Internet of the structural separation of these
two businesses. We use a panel of consumer level data and a discrete choice model to
estimate the price elasticities of demand and the marginal costs of broadband access
to the Internet. Based on these estimates, we simulate the effect on prices and social
welfare of the structural separation. Our results indicate that the structural separation
would lead to substantial price reductions. For broadband clients, on average, each
household would save 3.37 euros per month, or 14% of the current price levels. Overall,
on average, each household would save 2.73 euros per month, or 14% of the current
price levels. We test the robustness of our results in terms of: (i) the estimates of the
demand elasticities, (ii) the strategic behavior of the firms, and (iii) the market share
estimates. There is no evidence of collusion.
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1 Introduction
Networks for the distribution of cable television services, Cable Networks for short,
can be used to deliver telecommunication services, such as fixed telephony, or broadband
access to the Internet through cable modem. If a firm owns both the Public Switched
Telephone Network, PSTN, and a cable network, it controls two local access networks, that
can potentially compete against each other. This can hinder the development of competition
in the telecommunications industry. As Table 1 indicates, in Denmark, Finland, Greece,
Portugal and Sweden, the telecommunications incumbent owns cable networks.
[Table 1]
In the Unites States, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 recognized the importance
of cable television networks for providing an alternative infrastructure to the local access
network of the incumbent. It also recognized a potential conflict of interests. Section 302
imposed the structural separation of firms that own local telecommunications networks, and
firms that own cable television networks.1 The situation in Europe is more ambiguous.
The European Commission indicated a preference for the structural separation in the Cable
Directive 95/51/EC, Article 2, and the Communication 98/C 71/04. However, the legisla-
tion of the European Union, namely Directive 2002/77/CE, Article 8, imposed only legal
separation. Brito and Pereira (2006) and Brito and Pereira (forthcoming) discuss the role
of cable television networks and their ownership structure, in promoting competition in the
local access market.
[Table 2]
In Portugal, the telecommunications incumbent, the holding company Portugal Telecom,
PT, owns both the firm PT Comunicac¸o˜es, which operates the PSTN, and the firm TV Cabo
Portugal, CATVP, which operates the largest cable television network. As indicted in Table
2, broadband access to the Internet was first offered in Portugal through the cable modem
technology in 1999 by CATVP. One year later, in 2000, the Portuguese telecommunications
industry was fully liberalized.2 In 2001, the unbundling of the incumbent’s local loop was
mandated. As a consequence, PT.com, the Internet service provider of PT, started offering
broadband access to the Internet through the asymmetric digital subscriber line technology,
1Structural Separation is the separation of a firm into several legally independent firms, with little or no
cross ownership between them.
2In the EU countries, the telecommunications sector was a legal public monopoly for most of the twentieth
century. The objective of establishing an internal market for telecommunications services led the EU to
initiate the liberalization of the sector in the late 1980s. Council Resolution 93/C213/01 established the
deadline of January 1st of 1998 for the liberalization of all public voice telephony services. Some countries
were granted an additional transition period. In Portugal, the full liberalization occurred in 2000.
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ADSL. In 2005, PT had a market share of 75% in broadband access to the Internet, as Table
3 shows. Cabovisa˜o, the second largest cable television firm, had a market share of 15%. All
the other cable television firms, Bragatel, Pluricanal Leiria, Pluricanal Santare´m, and TV
Tel, also offer broadband access to the Internet through cable modem, but have only local
coverage. Most of the firms present in the fixed line business, such as Oni, Sonaecom, or AR
Telecom, offer broadband access to the Internet through ADSL, but until 2005 gained very
small market shares. As indicated in Table 1, in 2005 the penetration rate of broadband
access to the Internet in Portugal was 10%.
[Table 3]
Portugal offers a suitable framework to evaluate the merits of the structural separation
of a PSTN and a cable network. In this article, we use a rich panel of consumer level data,
to estimate the impact on the broadband access to the Internet of the structural separation
of these two businesses.3 We estimate a series of discrete choice models, to obtain the price
elasticities of demand for broadband access to the Internet. The model that fits the data
better is a random effects mixed logit model, in which unobserved household characteristics
are allowed to affect the price sensitivity coefficient, and the unobserved component is the
same for a given household for all periods. Households are very sensitive to price variations
in Internet access services. Assuming that firms play a Bertrand game, we use the demand
elasticities to estimate marginal costs. Given the demand and cost estimates, we simulate
the effect on prices and social welfare of the structural separation.
Our results indicate that the structural separation would lead to substantial price reduc-
tions. For broadband clients, on average, each household would save 3.37 euros per month,
or 14% of the current price levels. For narrowband clients, on average, each household would
save 0.53 euros per month, or 11% of the current price levels. Overall, i.e., including also
families that previously did not buy access to the Internet, on average, each household would
save 2.73 euros per month, or 14% of the current price levels. The price of some products
could decrease by as much as 16 euros. For broadband clients, on average, the consumer
surplus per household would increase by 2.56 euros per month, and the profits per house-
hold would decrease by 0.32 euros per month. Overall, on average, the consumer surplus
per household would increase by 1.69 euros per month, and the profits per household would
decrease by 0.37 euros per month.
We perform three exercises to test the robustness of our results. First, we simulate
parameter vectors, and use them to generate alternative demand elasticities. Then, we use
these demand elasticities to estimate the marginal costs. The alternative marginal cost
and price change estimates do not differ much from our original estimates. Second, we
3Pereira and Ribeiro (2006) use similar data for the Portuguese cable television industry.
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estimate the marginal costs, assuming that before the separation firms colluded on prices.
If we impose no restriction, the estimates of some of the marginal costs are negative. If we
impose a non-negativity restriction, the estimates of marginal costs imply lower price-cost
margins, than if firms played a Bertrand game before the separation. We interpret this as
evidence that firms do not collude in prices. Third, we calibrate our final model to reflect
the most recent information available on market shares, as well as the entry of firms not
present in our original data set. The price decreases caused by the separation become larger,
due to the higher penetration of broadband.
Our methodological approach draws on the discrete choice literature, represented among
others by Domencich and McFadden (1975), McFadden (1974), McFadden (1978), and Mc-
Fadden (1981). In the industrial organization literature, Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn,
and Pakes (1995), and Nevo (2001) applied discrete choice models to the analysis of market
structure. Dube (2005), Ivaldi (2005), Ivaldi and Verboven (2005), Nevo (2000), and Pinkse
and Slade (2004) analyzed the impact of mergers in a framework similar to ours.4 These
studies used aggregate data, with the exception of Dube (2005).
Regarding the empirical literature on broadband access to the Internet, Crandall, Sidak,
and Singer (2002) used a nested-logit model to produce demand elasticity estimates. They
obtained estimates of the own-price elasticities of demand for broadband access to the Inter-
net through ADSL and cable modem of −1.18 and −1.22, respectively, and of the cross-price
elasticity of demand for cable modem access with respect to the price of the ADSL of 0.60.
Rappoport, Kridel, Taylor, and Alleman (2003) conducted a similar analysis for a series
of models that differed in the choice set of Internet access available to households. Their
estimates of the own-price elasticity of demand for narrowband access ranged from −0.17
to −0.37. The estimates of the cross-price elasticity of demand for narrowband access with
respect to the prices of access to the Internet through cable modem and ADSL were 0.52 and
0.42, respectively; and the estimates of the cross-price elasticities of the demands for access
to the Internet through cable modem and ADSL with respect to the price of narrowband
access were 0. The estimates of the own-price elasticity of access through cable-modem
and ADSL ranged from −0.59 to −0.9, and −1.4 to −1.5, respectively. The estimate of
the cross-price elasticity of the demand for cable modem access with respect to the price of
ADSL access was 0.77, and the estimate of the cross-price elasticity of demand for ADSL
access with respect to the price of cable modem access was 0.62. Goolsbee (2006) obtained
higher estimates of own-price elasticity of the demand for broadband access to the Internet
in the range of −2.15 and −3.76. Varian (2000) reported own-price elasticities in the range
of −1.3 and −3.1 from the INDEX experiment.5
4See also Baker and Bresnahan (1985) and Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994).
5For other studies about the demand for broadband access to the Internet see Duffy-Deno (2002), Flamm
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The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section
3 presents the model. Section 4 describes the econometric implementation and presents
the basic estimation results. Section 5 analyzes the impact of a structural separation, and
Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The data used in this study consists of a rich micro panel. The information is based
on monthly invoices, collected by Marktest for mainland Portugal between April 2003 to
March 2004. The panel consists of around 1, 200 households surveyed each month, and
renewed periodically. Over the sample period, 1, 650 households were surveyed. The panel
is proportional, segmented by age, 8 education levels, 5 social classes, and 6 regions.6 The
histograms in Figure 1 describe the demographic variables in March 2004. The data for the
other months is similar.
[Figure 1]
We classified the Internet access options into eight products, and one outside option of
no Internet access. Product (1) is the outside option. Product (2) is narrowband access.
Products (3)-(6) belong to PT ; (3) is ADSL access, (4) and (5) are cable modem access
with different speeds, and (6) is a pay-as-you-go cable modem access. Finally, (7)-(9) are
products of Cabovisa˜o with different speeds. An explanation is in order. In our data set
only PT offers the dial-up service. However, in 2004, PT had a market share of dial-up of
only 25%, whereas IOL, Novis, Oni, and Nortenet had market shares of 32%, 27%, 10%, and
5%, respectively. We had two options, either assume that PT controlled all of the dial-up
business, or assume that PT controlled none of it. We chose the latter, and interpret the
share of this product as the share of dial-up as a whole, and not only the share of PT.7
[Figure 2]
[Figure 3]
and Chaudhurib (2005), Hausman, Sidak, and Singer (2001a), Hausman, Sidak, and Singer (2001b), Madden,
Savage, and Coble-Neal (1999), and Madden and Simpson (1996).
6The stratification of the sample was based on the 2001 census data from the Portuguese National
Statistics Institute. The education levels are: 1 - Illiterate or incomplete 4th grade, 2 - 4th grade, 3 - 6th
grade, 4 - 9th grade, 5 - 10th, 11th or 12th grade, 6 - incomplete Bachelor’s degree, 7 - Bachelor’s degree,
and 8 - other. The social class levels are: 1 - High, 2 - Medium/High, 3 - Medium, 4 - Medium/Low, 5 -
Low. The regions are: 1 - Greater Lisbon, 2 - Greater OPorto, 3 - Northern Coast, 4 - Central Coast, 5 -
Northern Interior, 6 - South.
7This is done also to allow the comparison of the results of section 5.1 with the results of the calibration
exercise in section 5.3, in which more firms with dial-up and ADSL are added.
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Figures 2 and 3 describe the evolution of the penetration rates and the market shares,
respectively. During the period under analysis, the market share of broadband access to the
Internet increased steadily, mostly at the expense of dial-up access. The penetration rates
of Internet access changed little throughout the period.
The data has three limitations. First, there is little price variation. Prices do not vary
geographically, and apart from minor adjustments, they do not vary over time either. This
implies that the price coefficient is identified through the interaction of price and household
characteristics, and from specifying other product characteristics that are not perfectly
collinear with the price variable. The second limitation of the data is that households rarely
change their choice of type of Internet access. Most variation in the access choices of the
households over time consists of the entry and exit of subjects from the market or the panel.
In addition, it is difficult to differentiate these events from sampling decisions of not to
survey a given household. The third limitation of the data is that it does not include all
firms active in the industry. However, as Table 2 indicates, PT and Cabovisa˜o represented
95% of the market in 2004, and 90% in 2005.
3 Economic Model
In this section, we present the econometric model. First, we provide a brief introduction
of the discrete choice models we estimate. Second, we describe the implications of these
models for the welfare analysis. Third, we present the assumptions about the behavior of
firms.
3.1 Demand
3.1.1 Utility of Internet Access
A household chooses among a set of alternative products of Internet access. The products
differ in: (i) the price, (ii) the speed of access, (iii) the bandwidth, i.e., narrowband or
broadband, (iv) the technology, i.e., ADSL or cable modem, and (v) the firm. PT.com
and CATVP have national coverage. Cabovisa˜o does not operate in some regions.8 For the
households of those regions we excluded the products of Cabovisa˜o from their choice set.
For the households of the regions where both PT and Cabovisa˜o operate, we included the
products of both firms in their choice set.9
8In Portugal, unlike other countries such as the US, there is no regulatory limit to the number of cable
television firms that can operate in the same geographic area, and overbuilds are common.
9Within a region were both PT and Cabovisa˜o operate, there might be sub-regions where the latter is
not active. We accounted for this possibility by estimating models where product dummy variables interact
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We omit time subscripts whenever possible. Household n = 1, ..., 1650 in period t =
1, ..., 12 derives from alternative i = 1, ..., 9 utility:
Unti(pti, znt, xi, ξn, ςn, εnti, θ) = Vnti(pti, znt, xi, ξn, ςn, θ) + εnti,
where pi is the price of alternative i, xi is a j dimensional vector of the other characteristics
of alternative i, zn is a k dimensional vector of household characteristics, ςnj and ξnk are
unobserved household components, which define the random coefficients associated with
each of the variables, θ is a vector of parameters, and finally εni is a random disturbance
independent across products, households, and time, and identically distributed. We assume
additionally that:
Vni(pi, zn, xi, ξn, ςn, θ) := piα(zn, ξn, γ, σγ) + g(xi, ςn, β, σβ),
where
α(zn, ξn) := − exp
[
K∑
k=1
znk(γk + σγkξnk)
]
,
g(xi, ςn, β, σβ) :=
J∑
j=1
xij(βj + σβj ςnj),
θ := (γ, σγ, β, σβ),
and where α(·) is the negative of the marginal utility of income, which depends on individual
characteristics. The exponential transformation imposes the restriction that the marginal
utility of income is positive. All individual characteristics are therefore identified by an
interaction with a price variable. Expression g(·) is a linear combination that summarizes
the utility component associated with all product characteristics other than price. The
parameters γ and σγ translate the effect of individual characteristics on the marginal utility
of income. The parameters β and σβ translate the household valuation of the different
product characteristics. This formulation encompasses all the models analyzed in this paper.
If σβj = σγk = 0, and εni has an extreme value Type I distribution, one obtains the standard
multinomial logit model. If one sets the joint distribution of εni to be of the generalized
extreme value family, with the required generating function, one obtains the nested logit
model. If σβj 6= 0 or σγk 6= 0, one obtains the mixed logit model. Note that (ςn, ξn) do not
depend on t. Hence, for the models that use the whole panel, these unobserved components
capture the correlation over time between choices of the same household, given the limited
with region dummy variables. If in a region households chose a product of PT only because Cabovisa˜o was
not active, then the estimate of the coefficient of the product of the dummy variable of Cabovisa˜o with the
dummy variable of that region ought to be negative. However, the estimates of those coefficients were not
statistically significant.
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time variation in our data. For the models that use a single month of data, these terms
capture only the correlation between alternatives, leading to flexible substitution patterns.
3.1.2 Choice Probabilities
Household n chooses product i if Uni > Unj, for all j 6= i. This occurs with probability:
Pi := Pr [Vi − Vj + εi > εj, for all j 6= i, j = 1, . . . , 9] =∫
Fi(Vi − V1 + u, . . . , u, . . . , Vi − V9 + u)du
where F (·) is the joint distribution function of (ε1, . . . , εI), and Fi(·) is its partial derivative
with respect to the ith argument.
If F (·) is an extreme value type I distribution, one obtains the standard multinomial
logit expression for the choice probabilities:
Pni =
eVni∑
j e
Vnj
.
If Vni depends on unobserved components, the choice probabilities result from the inte-
gration over these components, and one obtains the mixed logit expression for the choice
probabilities:
Pni =
∫
eVni∑
j e
Vnj
f(ςn, ξn)dςndξn.
In models that use the whole panel, one must consider the sequence of choices made by
a given household. The choices in different periods are not independent. Their dependence
is modeled though the unobserved household characteristics common to all periods. The
probability of observing a given sequence of choices i = (i1, . . . , iT ) of products over time is:
Pni =
∫ T∏
t=1
eVnitt∑
j e
Vnjt
f(ςn, ξn)dςndξn.
3.1.3 Likelihood Function
The log-likelihood functions corresponding to the multinomial logit and mixed logit
models are:
L =
∑
n
∑
i
yni ln(Pni),
where yni = 1 if household n chooses product i, and zero otherwise. In this case, either one
ignores the relationship between choices over time, or alternatively, one applies the model
to the data of a single month.
For models that use the whole panel, the log-likelihood function is:
L =
∑
n
∑
i
sni ln(Pni),
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where the summation is over all possible sequences of choices, and sni =
∏T
t=1 ynitt, i.e.,
sni = 1 if household n had a sequence of choices given by i, and 0 otherwise.
3.1.4 Price Elasticities of Demand
Denote by εnij, the elasticity of demand of product i with respect to price of product j
for household n:
εnij :=
∂Pni
∂pj
pj
Pni
.
In the multinomial logit model, the partial derivative is:
∂Pni
∂pj
=
 αnPni(1− Pni) if i = j−αnPniPnj otherwise
implying the following elasticities:
εnij =
 αnpi(1− Pni) if i = j−αnpjPnj otherwise
In the mixed logit model the partial derivative is:
∂Pni
∂pj
=

∫
αn(ξ)P˜ni(ς, ξ)(1− P˜ni(ς, ξ))f(ς, ξ)dςdξ if i = j∫ −αn(ξ)Pni(ς, ξ)Pnj(ς, ξ)f(ς, ξ)dςdξ otherwise,
where P˜ni(ς, ξ) =
eVni(ς,ξ)∑
j e
Vnj(ς,ξ)
. The elasticities are obtained using the expression used above.
We computed the demand elasticities of subsets of products with the formula:
εab =
[∑
i∈a
∑
j∈b
∂Pni
∂pj
] ∑
j∈bwjpj∑
i∈a Pni
,
where a and b are disjoint subsets of products, and wj :=
Pnj∑
k∈b Pnk
.
3.1.5 Consumer Welfare Variation
Denote by V
′
nj and V
′′
nj, the utility levels before and after the structural separation,
respectively. The structural separation implies two types of changes. First, prices change,
which requires computing the market equilibrium after the separation. Second, the char-
acteristics of the products change, i.e., xi and zn change. We assume that the number of
products offered does not change.
The generalized extreme value model, of which the multinomial and the nested logit
models are particular cases, provides a convenient computational formula for the exact
consumers’ surplus, up to a constant, associated with a policy that changes the attributes
of the products in the market. Such expression, known as the “log sum” formula, is:
∆CSn =
1
α
[
lnH
(
eV
′′
n1 , . . . , eV
′′
nJ
)
− lnH
(
eV
′
n1 , . . . , eV
′
nJ
)]
, (1)
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where H(·) is the generating function of the generalized extreme value distribution.10
This formula is valid only when the indirect utility function is linear in income, i.e., when
prices changes have no income effects, which is the case assumed here.
For the mixed logit model, the integration of (1) with respect to the unobserved household
characteristics provides an approximation of the change in the aggregate consumer surplus.
3.2 Supply
3.2.1 Price Equilibrium
The profit function of firm i is:
Πi =
J∑
j=1
δijpij,
where pij := pjQj(p)− Cj(Qj(p)) is the profit in market j, δij = 1 if firm i sells product j,
and δij = 0 otherwise. We assume that firms choose prices and play a static non-cooperative
game, i.e., a Bertrand game.11 The Nash equilibrium of the game is characterized by the
following set of first order conditions:12
I∑
i=1
δik
∂Πi
∂pk
=
I∑
i=1
δik
[
δikQk +
J∑
j=1
δij
∂Qj
∂pk
(
pj − ∂Cj
∂pj
)]
= Qk +
J∑
j=1
γkj
∂Qj
∂pk
(pj − cj),
where cj :=
∂Cj
∂pj
, and γkj = 1 if products j and k are sold by the same firm, and γkj = 0
otherwise.
Let matrices Γ and Φ consist of the elements Γij = γij and Φij =
∂Qj
∂pi
, respectively.
Matrix Γ represents the market structure, and matrix Φ consists of the demand estimates.
Denote by A ◦ B the element by element product of matrices A and B, i.e., the Hadamard
product. The system that defines the equilibrium can be written as:
Q+ (Γ ◦ Φ)(p− c) = 0. (2)
Initially there are three firms: (i) a firm that offers dial-up services, the Dial-Up firm,
(ii) CATVP, and (iii) Cabovisa˜o. The dial-up firm controls one product, CATVP controls
10This expression was developed by Domencich and McFadden (1975), and McFadden (1974) for the
multinomial logit model, and by McFadden (1978) and McFadden (1981) for the nested logit model. Small
and Rosen (1981) elaborate on the connection between the above measures of welfare and standard measures
of consumer surplus. For the logit model: H (x1, . . . , xJ) =
∑J
j=1 xj .
11Internet access through cable modem is unregulated. In addition, the retail broadband access offer of
PT.com, which is based on the ADSL wholesale offer of PTC, is also unregulated.
12We assume that a Nash equilibrium exists. Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) proved existence in a general
discrete choice model, with single product firms. Anderson and de Palma (1992) proved existence for the
nested logit model with symmetric multiproduct firms.
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four products, and Cabovisa˜o controls the remaining three. Thus:
Γ =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1

In the course of the analysis, we will assume two alternative forms for the matrix Γ, as-
sociated with the cases of: (i) structural separation, and (ii) perfect collusion before the
separation.
3.2.2 Profit Variation
Denote by (Q′,p′) and (Q′′,p′′) the levels of output and prices before and after the
structural separation, respectively. Taking a first-order approximation of the cost function
of product j around the current level of output, the profit function is:
pij(Q,p) = pjQj − Cj(Qj) ' pjQj − Cj(Q′j)− cj(Qj −Q′j).
The profit variation for product j is then:
∆pij = pij(Q
′′,p′′)− pij(Q′,p′) ' p′′jQ′′j − p′jQ′j − cj(Q′′j −Q′j) = (p′′j − cj)Q′′j − (p′j − cj)Q′j.
4 Econometric Implementation
4.1 Basic Estimation Results
We estimated five models by maximum likelihood.13 Table 4 presents the results.
[Table 4]
Model 1 is a stacked logit model, i.e., a model where the same household in different
periods is considered a different household. This model, presented for comparison purposes,
ignores the correlation of the choices of a household over time. As a consequence, the
estimated standard deviations are artificially low. We also estimated twelve monthly logit
models. The results showed that the estimates are very stable across periods, and are very
close to those of Model 1. This reflects the fact that households do not change their choice
of provider over the period in our sample.
[Table 5]
13Integration, when necessary, was performed numerically by the Gaussian-Hermite quadrature, except
in the models that required more than one integral, in which case integration was done by simulation. All
procedures were coded in MATLAB.
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Model 2 is a logit model, where product dummies are allowed to evolve over time. Table 5
presents the estimates of the coefficients of these additional dummy variables. The evolution
of the estimates reflects the evolution of market shares, which was very small over the period
of our sample. The estimates of most of these coefficients are not statistically significant.
We also estimated a nested logit model with three nests: one for no Internet access,
one for PT, and one for Cabovisa˜o. The substitution pattern had to be constrained to be
compatible with random utility maximization, in which case the estimates became very close
to those of Models 1 and 2. This nested logit model is therefore omitted.
As it is well know, the multinomial logit model has the property of independence of
irrelevant alternatives, IIA. We performed three types of tests to determine if the data
complied with the IIA property, and the direction of any eventual departure from this
property. First, we performed Hausman-McFadden type of tests (Hausman and McFadden
(1984)) for Model 1, using different subgroups of the choices, and performing the test for
each period. The tests were implemented in their Lagrange Multiplier version as described
in McFadden (1987). The null hypothesis that the data complies with the IIA property
was rejected in the vast majority of cases. Second, we performed Lagrange Multiplier tests
with the nested logit model as the alternative, also described in McFadden (1987). The null
hypothesis was not rejected in most cases. This suggests that the failure previously detected
should be corrected with models other than those of the nested logit class. Third, we
performed Lagrange Multiplier specification tests for the multinomial logit against mixture
models described in McFadden and Train (2000). The null hypothesis was rejected when
the mixture was associated with the parameters γ, that translate the the effect of individual
characteristics on the marginal utility of income α(·).
Given the results of these tests, we estimated several mixed logit models. Models with
mixture components associated with the variables education, social class and age produced
essentially the same results as models with a mixture component only on the constant term.
Besides, for some periods, the former models are not statistically significantly better than
the latter models. Thus, we present and discuss only the more parsimonious models with a
mixture component in the constant term.
Model 3 is a mixed logit model, where unobserved household characteristics are allowed
to affect the sensitivity of price. The mixing distribution is a normal distribution. This
formulation allows a flexible substitution pattern between products. However, the correla-
tion between observations of a single household is still ignored. The same household in two
different periods is considered a different household. We also ran an alternative version of
this model, where the parameters were estimated on a monthly basis. The estimates of the
coefficients of the model remained stable across periods.
12
Model 4 is a random effects mixed logit model, where the unobserved component is the
same for a given household for all periods. The decrease in the log-likelihood is noticeable.
This translates the fact that households change Internet provider very infrequently, and
therefore the choices of the households are highly correlated over time.
Model 5 is similar to Model 4, except that it has some extra random components. The
elasticities implied by this models are very close to those of Model 4.
Given the previous discussion, we select Model 4 to conduct our analysis.14
The households’ price sensitivity is decreasing in the education level, the social class, and
the age until the late 40’s, and increasing in the age afterwards.15 The price sensitivity also
seems to be higher in the northeast, and smaller in the south. The median of the distribution
of the marginal utility of income, α, is 1.47 euro. This means that one euro spent in access to
the Internet reduces the budget constraint of the household by 1.47, i.e., reduces the budget
constraint more than proportionately. This reinforces the observation made in the previous
paragraph, that households make their Internet access choices having in mind a time horizon
larger than one month. The estimates of the coefficients of product characteristics reflect
the consumers’ valuation of these attributes relative to no access. For instance, the negative
coefficient −0.79 of Cabovisa˜o translates into a negative median premium of 0.54 = 0.79
1.47
euros for the products of this firm.
4.2 Price Elasticities of Demand
Table 6 presents the average of the elasticities, εnij, over all households, using the
parameter estimates of Model 4. The results indicate that the demands for the products
considered are elastic with respect to price.
[Table 6]
[Table 7]
[Table 8]
The uncertainty about the parameter estimates of the consumer choice model reflects
into the demand elasticity estimates. To assess the effect of this uncertainty, we simulated
1, 000 parameter vectors from a multivariate normal distribution with a mean and variance-
covariance matrix given by the parameter estimates of Model 4. For each simulated vector,
we computed the matrix of the demand elasticities and its Frobenius norm. The matrices
14Doing all the analysis with model 4 or 5 yields essentially the same results. Model 4 has computational
advantages in terms of speed since numerical integration was used in all calculation were it was required.
15Recall from footnote 4 that in Marktest ’s coding, lower values for the social class variable indicate a
higher social class. Social class is presumably a proxy for income level.
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presented in Tables 7 and 8 correspond to the matrices with the norm in percentile 1 and
99, respectively. The variation in the average elasticities across Tables 6, 7, and 8 is small.16
[Table 9]
[Table 10]
Tables 9 and 10 report the price elasticities of demand of subsets of products. The
results suggest that: (i) the demand for broadband access is more elastic than the demand
for narrowband access, (ii) broadband and narrowband access are substitutes, and (iii) the
demand for broadband access is less sensitive to the price of narrowband access, than the
demand for narrowband access to the price of broadband access.
5 Analysis
5.1 Structural Separation assuming Nash ex-ante
The separation of the ADSL and cable modem businesses of PT would result in a market
with four firms: (i) a firm with the dial-up business, (ii) a firm with the ADSL business
of PT, (iii) a firm with the cable modem business of PT, and (iv) Cabovisa˜o, which would
maintain its products. The structural separation consists of a change from matrix Γ to
matrix Γ′, given by:
Γ′ =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1

We impose two assumptions on marginal costs. The first assumption is that marginal
costs are constant. The second assumption is that marginal costs depend only on firm
characteristics and type of product, such as dial-up, cable modem, ADSL, and pay as you
go. This implies that marginal costs are the same for all cable products within a firm. We
made these two assumptions on marginal costs due to data limitations. On section 6, we
comment the likely impact of these assumptions on our results.
[Table 11]
Given the elasticities of Table 6, we solved system (2) numerically with respect to c.
We obtained estimates of marginal costs, cˆ, which are presented in Table 11. Then, given
16Alternatively, one could estimate the marginal costs for each of the simulated vectors, and compute the
distribution of marginal costs implied by the distribution of the parameter estimates. This would, however,
be computationally burdensome, and would provide information qualitatively similar to ours.
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the value of these estimates, and replacing Γ with Γ′, we solved system (2) with respect to
prices, to estimate the price of each product after the separation. The results are presented
in Table 12.
[Table 12]
After the separation, the prices of broadband products decrease on average 2.58 euros,
i.e., decrease 12% of their current levels. The price of narrowband decreases on average
0.32 euros, i.e., decrease 06% of their current levels. Overall, prices decrease on average
0.99 euros, i.e., decrease 10% of their current levels. The largest reductions occur for cable
modem products (5) and (9), for which prices decrease by as much as 11 euros. Product (7)
may experience a mild price increase.
[Table 13]
Table 13 reports the impact on welfare of the separation. After the separation, for
broadband, on average, the consumer surplus per household increases by 0.81 euros per
month, the profits per household decrease by 0.00 euros per month, and the social welfare
per household increases by 0.81 euros per month. For narrowband, on average, the consumer
surplus per household increases by 0.64 euros per month, the profits per household decrease
by 0.08 euros per month, and the social welfare increases by 0.56 euros per month. Overall,
i.e., including also families that previously did not buy access to the Internet, on average,
the consumer surplus per household increases by 0.51 euros per month, the profits per
household decrease by 0.08 euros per month, and the social welfare per households increases
by 0.43 euros per month. The apparent discrepancy between the magnitude of the average
price decrease and the magnitude of the increase in consumer surplus is explained by two
reasons. First, the price variation captures only the welfare effect of the marginal consumer,
whereas the consumer surplus also captures the welfare effect of the submarginal consumers,
including those that currently do not but access to the Internet. The second reason is that
the median of the distribution of the marginal utility of income, α, is 1.47.17
We repeated the previous exercises for the elasticities of Tables 7 and 8. In Table 11 we
report the respective marginal cost estimates, and in Table 12 we report the prices after the
separation. The new results about the price variations caused by a structural separation do
not differ much from those based on the elasticities of Table 6. In the case of the elasticities
of Table 7, i.e., the matrix of elasticities with the norm in percentile 1, prices decrease on
average 0.95 euros, or, 9.7% of their current levels. In the case of the elasticities of Table 8,
i.e., the matrix of elasticities with the norm in percentile 99, prices decrease on average 2.17
euros, or, 22.5% of their current levels. Table 13 reports the associated consumer surplus
and profit changes caused by the separation.
17One euro saved in Internet access increases the budget constraint of a household by 11.47 = 0.68 euros.
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5.2 Structural Separation assuming Collusion ex-ante
In section 5.1, we assumed that before the structural separation, firms played a Bertrand
game. But firms could have played a game that led to either more or less competitive
outcomes, than those implied by a Bertrand game. Since we have no cost data, we cannot
explore the first possibility. Regarding the second possibility, we estimate the marginal costs
assuming that before the separation firms played a cooperative game. More specifically, we
assume that before the separation, firms maximized jointly their profits. Matrix Γ is now:
Γ =

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

We maintain the assumption that after the separation firms play a Bertrand game.
If we impose no restriction, the estimates of marginal costs of products (2) and (6) are
large and negative. If we impose a non-negativity restriction, the marginal cost estimates are
higher than those obtained assuming that firms play a Bertrand game before the separation.
This implies that the firms have lower price-cost margins if they collude, than if they play
a Bertrand game. In addition, the price decreases following a separation are smaller. We
interpret these results as implying that the data does not support the hypothesis that firms
collude perfectly on prices.
5.3 Calibration of the Market Shares
The most recent observations from our data set are from 2004:1. Since the market has
been changing very fast, our data set does not reflect the current market shares. Besides,
some of the firms that currently provide ADSL and dial-up services are not present in our
data set. We believe that the bias in the sample is independent of the characteristics of the
households; the bias reflects mostly the diffusion process in the adoption of broadband, and
the data collection decisions ofMarktest. If this is true, then only the coefficients that reflect
directly market shares, i.e., the coefficients of the product dummy variables, were estimated
inconsistently. One can, therefore, obtain consistent estimates for these coefficients by a
calibration process that adjusts them, so that the model’s predicted market shares match
actual market shares.18
Partition the vector of coefficients, θ, into (θ1, θ2), where θ1 represents the coefficients
associated with product dummy variables, and θ2 represents all the remaining coefficients.
18There are several alternative techniques to correct the bias of some of the coefficients of the model. See,
e.g., Manski and McFadden (1981), in particular chapters 1 and 2. The first method that appeared in the
econometrics literature addressing this issue was the WESML estimator of Manski and Lerman (1977).
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Let si represent the correct market share for product i, and θˆ2 the estimated value of θ2.
The calibrated value of θ1, denoted by θ˜1, is defined by:
θ˜1 := argmin
θ1
I∑
i=1
(
si − 1
N
N∑
n=1
Pni(θ1, θˆ2)
)2
It is possible to add new products not present in the initial sample, provided that one can
compute Pni. All that is required is that one: (i) knows the value of the exogenous variables
that characterize these products, and, (ii) includes new product dummy variables. Then,
one is left with stipulating a price for the dial-up and ADSL products not present in the
sample. We set the prices of these new products equal to those of PT.19
[Table 14]
[Table 15]
[Table 16]
The elasticities that result from the calibration exercise are reported in Table 14, where
we introduced six new products for four additional firms. Tables 15 and 16 present elasticities
by aggregate products. In general, the own and cross price elasticities of products (2) to (9)
increase.
[Table 17]
Table 17 presents the marginal cost estimates for the calibrated model. In general, the
marginal cost estimates of products (2) to (9) increase.
[Table 18]
Table 18 presents the prices after separation for the calibrated model. After the separa-
tion, the prices of broadband products decrease on average 3.37 euros, i.e., decrease 14% of
their current levels. The prices of narrowband decrease on average 0.53 euros, i.e., decrease
11% of their current levels. Overall, prices decrease on average 2.73 euros, i.e., decrease 14%
of their current levels. The largest reductions occur again for cable modem products (5) and
(9), for which prices decrease by as much as 16 euros. Product (7) may experience a price
increase. The price decreases are now larger, due to the higher penetration of broadband.
[Table 19]
Table 19 presents the surplus variations for the calibrated model. After the separation,
for broadband, on average, the consumer surplus per household increases by 2.56 euros
per month, the profits per household decrease by 0.32 euros per month, and the social
19In reality, prices differ little, if at all.
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welfare per household increases by 2.24 euros per month. For narrowband, on average, the
consumer surplus per household increases by 2.12 euros per month, the profits per household
decrease by 0.05 euros per month, and the social welfare increases by 2.07 euros per month.
Overall, i.e., including also households that previously did not buy access to the Internet, on
average, the consumer surplus per household increases by 1.69 euros per month, the profits
per household decrease by 0.37 euros per month, and the social welfare per households
increases by 1.32 euros per month.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this article, we evaluated the impact on broadband access to the Internet of the
structural separation of the telephone and the cable networks of the Portuguese telecommu-
nications’ incumbent. We used consumer level data and a discrete choice model to estimate
the price elasticities of demand and marginal costs for broadband access to the Internet.
Given these estimates, we simulated the effects on prices and welfare of the structural sep-
aration. Our results suggest that the increase in competition, caused by the structural
separation, may lead to substantial price decreases, as well as to consumer welfare increases.
We assumed that marginal costs are constant.20 This assumption is acceptable if the
structural separation does not result in large shifts in consumer shares across firms, and a
large expansion in the size of the market. In other words, this assumption is acceptable
to measure the short-run impact of the structural separation. Otherwise, our estimates of
price changes underestimate the impact of the structural separation. In addition, if the firms
in the industry face moral hazard agency problems, such as those analyzed by Gagnepain
and Pereira (forthcoming), the increase in competitive pressure unleashed by the structural
separation, could induce firms to increase their cost reducing efforts, and thereby lead to
lower marginal costs.
To be sure, the analysis conducted in this article gives an incomplete assessment of the
impact of the structural separation of a telephone network and a cable network. First, we
ignored the costs of the divestiture process. Second, we focused on broadband access to the
Internet. A structural separation would impact other markets, such as fixed telephony and
subscription television. The cable television firm of the incumbent could offer fixed telephony
over its network. Or, the fixed telephony firm of the incumbent could offer subscription
television over its network. Third, we ignored the impact of emerging technologies, such
as the wireless local loop and powerline communications, that can allow the deployment of
20Ribeiro and Pereira (2006) found evidence of scope economies between cable television and cable modem
services, and of increasing returns to scale for the cable modem service.
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alternative local access networks. These technologies are promising. However, it is unlikely
that they will have a large impact in the near future.
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Table 1: Industry Indicators on October 2005
Penetration DSL’s Incumbent Incumbent has Penetration
Rate BB Share Share Cable Modem Rate PCs
South Korea 25.5
Netherland 22.5 60 43 77
Denmark 21.8 63 60 yes 70
Finland 18.7 79 67 yes 52
Sweden 18.5 65 36 yes 80
Japan 16.4
USA 14.5
UK 13.5 72 25 62
EU 11 80 50
Portugal 9.9 57 78 yes 34
Spain 9.3 49
Italy 10 94 70 47
Ireland 4.3 76 59 yes 47
Greece 0.8 98 74 33
Source: Authors
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Table 2: Chronology of the Portuguese Telecommunications Industry
1981 creation of sectorial regulator, ICP-ANACOM
1987 beginning of digitalization of the PSTN
1992 beginning of Cable Tv in Madeira and Ac¸ ores
1994 group PT formed
beginning of Cable Tv in mainland Portugal through CATVP
1996 Cabovisa˜o starts operations
1997 basic Telecommunications Law
1998 full liberalization of the telecommunications industry in the EU
CATVP offers Cable Tv through digital satelite
1999 Law 458/99 of the scope of Universal Service
full digitalization of PSTN
broadband access to Internet through Cable Modem
2000 full liberalization of the telecommunications industry in Portugal
introduction of carrier pre-selection
2001 introduction of number portability
local loop unbundling
2003 implementation of the 99 Revision
Source: Authors
Table 3: Market Shares
2003 2004 2005
Group PT 78 80 75
Cabovisa˜o 16 15 15
Others 4 5 10
ADSL 38 42 50
Cable Modem 62 58 50
Source: Authors
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Table 4: Demand Model Estimates I
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
const -0.602** -0.600* 1.305*** 1.435*** 1.653**
-2.225 -1.676 3.270 4.265 2.327
educ -2.349*** -2.342 -4.501*** -2.051*** -2.440***
-10.091 -0.811 -13.630 -6.877 -3.562
class 2.997*** 2.986*** 6.156*** 1.719*** 2.089
6.354 4.137 4.273 3.566 1.409
age -5.065*** -5.054*** -8.618*** -3.450*** -3.290**
-10.962 -11.903 -8.225 -6.564 -2.182
max(age-48,0) 9.288*** 9.265*** 16.991*** 8.191*** 8.280***
11.560 6.316 9.355 8.593 9.037
northeast 0.564*** 0.558*** 0.790*** 0.698*** 0.583***
10.138 3.081 9.490 9.232 3.374
south 0.234*** 0.229 0.137 -0.115 -0.029
3.332 1.414 1.580 -0.788 -0.203
dialup 0.683*** 0.681 1.154*** 6.774*** 7.063***
6.216 0.623 8.900 15.881 12.794
adsl -1.093*** -1.684 -0.849*** 5.957*** 6.327***
-8.270 -1.298 -5.522 12.938 10.236
cable -1.292*** -1.330 -0.821*** 5.157*** 5.621***
-14.070 -1.298 -7.009 12.183 10.196
cv -0.593*** -0.593*** -0.567*** -0.790*** -0.701***
-9.979 -2.630 -8.692 -4.149 -3.605
payg -1.181*** -1.182 -0.940*** -3.408*** -3.529***
-12.344 -1.133 -8.874 -12.080 -9.476
fast 0.665*** 0.670 0.397*** 1.418*** 1.188***
8.854 1.411 5.422 6.900 5.790
std const 1.749*** 0.943*** 1.788***
11.463 22.485 18.583
std educ 0.672***
8.887
std class 0.057
0.215
std age 0.570**
2.366
std max(age-48,0) 0.161
0.219-α 25%
-α 25% 0.040 0.040 0.059 0.781 0.625
-α median 0.076 0.076 0.208 1.296 1.138
-α 75% 0.139 0.139 0.718 2.174 2.073Logl
Logl 12984 12966 12759 7742 7347
Pseudo R2 0.5216 0.5223 0.5299 0.7148 0.7293
N 12352 12352 12352 12352 12352
(1) - Stacked multinomial logit; (2) - Stacked multinomial logit; (3) - Stacked mixed logit; (4) Random effects mixed logit;
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. t-stats are presented in smaller font size below the
corresponding coefficient
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Table 5: Demand Models Estimates II - Model (2)
Month dialup adsl cable
m2 0.048 0.273 0.157
0.190 0.674 0.739
m3 0.075 0.302 0.211
0.309 0.741 1.034
m4 0.099 0.466 0.101
0.343 0.503 0.389
m5 0.081 0.575 0.089
0.191 0.220 0.153
m6 0.035 0.609 0.128
0.202 0.326 0.499
m7 -0.006 0.682 -0.019
-0.004 0.155 -0.005
m8 -0.021 0.670 -0.039
-0.008 0.163 -0.005
m9 -0.025 0.710 -0.069
-0.019 0.353 -0.020
m10 -0.002 0.843 * 0.039
-0.006 1.738 0.060
m11 -0.094 0.886 ** 0.066
-0.311 1.978 0.133
m12 -0.192 0.767 -0.114
-0.429 0.175 -0.184
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Table 6: Estimated Elasticities - I
εij (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) si
(1) 0.000 0.493 * 0.005 0.013 0.003 0.044 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.618
(2) 0.000 -1.364 0.056 0.127 0.037 0.127 * 0.066 0.084 0.009 0.269
(3) 0.000 0.324 -4.037 ** 0.388 * 0.356 0.041 0.184 ** 0.373 0.107 0.016
(4) 0.000 0.564 ** 0.303 ** -3.644 ** 0.237 0.067 0.178 * 0.302 0.088 0.022
(5) 0.000 0.200 0.420 *** 0.341 * -3.716 ** 0.039 0.161 * 0.320 0.101 0.014
(6) 0.000 1.160 *** 0.083 0.166 0.067 -2.479 *** 0.086 0.109 0.013 0.027
(7) 0.000 0.566 ** 0.296 ** 0.365 * 0.232 0.068 -3.833 *** 0.372 0.084 0.012
(8) 0.000 0.444 * 0.330 *** 0.352 * 0.249 0.047 0.208 *** -3.809 ** 0.084 0.018
(9) 0.000 0.277 0.381 *** 0.424 *** 0.293 0.023 0.198 *** 0.361 -4.759 * 0.003
(1) - No access; (2) - Dial-up (PT); (3) - ADSL (PT); (4) - Cable V1 (PT); (5) - Cable V2 (PT); (6) - Cable, pay as
you go (PT); (7) - Cable V1 (CV); (8) - Cable V2 (CV); (9) - Cable V3 (CV)
The elasticity values correspond to the average over households.
”***”, ”**”, and ”*” mean that the estimate is significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels,
respectively. The null hypothesis is -1 for diagonal elements, and 0 for off-diagonal elements.
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Table 7: Estimated Elasticities - II
εij (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) si
(1) 0.000 0.427 * 0.008 0.015 0.006 0.048 0.009 0.010 0.001 0.621
(2) 0.000 -1.283 0.065 0.114 0.044 0.119 * 0.065 0.079 0.013 0.250
(3) 0.000 0.288 -3.461 0.274 * 0.273 0.041 0.144 ** 0.265 0.094 0.019
(4) 0.000 0.469 * 0.254 ** -3.154 * 0.192 0.065 0.143 ** 0.223 0.082 0.023
(5) 0.000 0.180 0.330 *** 0.238 * -3.127 * 0.041 * 0.125 * 0.225 0.087 0.018
(6) 0.000 0.899 *** 0.093 0.144 0.075 -2.108 ** 0.082 0.099 0.016 0.031
(7) 0.000 0.468 * 0.251 ** 0.264 * 0.190 0.065 -3.260 ** 0.274 0.079 0.014
(8) 0.000 0.381 0.274 *** 0.253 * 0.200 0.046 0.166 *** -3.318 * 0.077 0.019
(9) 0.000 0.255 0.304 *** 0.298 *** 0.221 0.024 0.155 *** 0.256 -4.089 0.005
(1) - No access; (2) - Dial-up (PT); (3) - ADSL (PT); (4) - Cable V1 (PT); (5) - Cable V2 (PT); (6) - Cable, pay as
you go (PT); (7) - Cable V1 (CV); (8) - Cable V2 (CV); (9) - Cable V3 (CV)
The elasticity values correspond to the average over households.
”***”, ”**”, and ”*” mean that the estimate is significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels,
respectively.
The null hypothesis is -1 for diagonal elements, and 0 for off-diagonal elements.
Table 8: Estimated Elasticities - III
εij (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) si
(1) 0.000 0.542 * 0.004 0.014 0.002 0.050 0.007 0.008 0.000 0.613
(2) 0.000 -1.485 0.055 0.158 0.031 0.154 * 0.079 0.094 0.008 0.270
(3) 0.000 0.348 -4.678 ** 0.533 * 0.401 0.046 0.246 ** 0.491 0.112 0.015
(4) 0.000 0.630 * 0.362 ** -4.103 ** 0.255 0.080 0.236 * 0.390 0.088 0.026
(5) 0.000 0.204 0.527 *** 0.469 * -4.357 ** 0.043 0.215 * 0.427 0.110 0.013
(6) 0.000 1.343 *** 0.085 0.212 0.058 -2.792 *** 0.106 0.126 0.011 0.029
(7) 0.000 0.636 * 0.352 ** 0.498 * 0.247 0.082 -4.397 *** 0.483 0.084 0.013
(8) 0.000 0.490 0.396 ** 0.478 * 0.271 0.055 0.277 *** -4.347 ** 0.084 0.019
(9) 0.000 0.298 0.466 *** 0.573 *** 0.333 0.025 0.260 *** 0.466 -5.592 * 0.003
(1) - No access; (2) - Dial-up (PT); (3) - ADSL (PT); (4) - Cable V1 (PT); (5) - Cable V2 (PT); (6) - Cable, pay as
you go (PT); (7) - Cable V1 (CV); (8) - Cable V2 (CV); (9) - Cable V3 (CV)
The elasticity values correspond to the average over households.
”***”, ”**”, and ”*” mean that the estimate is significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels,
respectively.
The null hypothesis is -1 for diagonal elements, and 0 for off-diagonal elements.
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Table 9: Estimated Elasticities - IV
εij No access Narrowband Broadband si
No access 0.000 0.412 0.135 0.618
Narrowband 0.000 -1.156 0.876 0.269
Broadband 0.000 0.503 -2.836 0.113
Table 10: Estimated Elasticities - V
εij No access Narrowband ADSL Cable si
No access 0.000 0.412 0.003 0.124 0.618
Narrowband 0.000 -1.156 0.070 0.772 0.269
ADSL 0.000 0.206 -3.196 1.236 0.016
Cable 0.000 0.550 0.298 -3.130 0.097
Table 11: Marginal Cost Estimates
Product p Nash ex-ante
Elast I Elast II Elast III
(1)
(2) 5.0 0.7 0.3 1.0
(3) 29.4 15.2 13.2 16.4
(4) 19.8 11.4 10.0 12.0
(5) 35.0 11.4 10.0 12.0
(6) 6.2 3.0 2.3 3.4
(7) 19.5 14.1 12.4 15.0
(8) 24.0 14.1 12.4 15.0
(9) 35.5 14.1 12.4 15.0
(1) - No access; (2) - Dial-up (PT); (3) - ADSL (PT); (4) - Cable V1 (PT);
(5) - Cable V2 (PT); (6) - Cable, pay as you go (PT); (7) - Cable V1 (CV);
(8) - Cable V2 (CV); (9) - Cable V3 (CV)
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Table 12: Marginal Costs and Prices after Structural Separation assuming Nash ex-ante
After Separation
Product Today Elast I Elast II Elast III
p c p ∆p p−cp c p ∆p
p−c
p c p ∆p
p−c
p
(1)
(2) 5.0 0.7 4.7 -0.3 0.86 0.3 4.1 -0.9 0.93 1.0 5.1 0.1 0.80
(3) 29.4 15.2 24.4 -5.0 0.38 13.2 24.5 -4.9 0.46 16.4 24.1 -5.3 0.32
(4) 19.8 11.4 18.9 -0.8 0.40 10.0 18.6 -1.2 0.46 12.0 19.6 -0.2 0.39
(5) 35.0 11.4 24.2 -10.8 0.53 10.0 25.7 -9.3 0.61 12.0 20.3 -14.7 0.41
(6) 6.2 3.0 6.0 -0.2 0.49 2.3 4.8 -1.4 0.52 3.4 9.6 3.4 0.65
(7) 19.5 14.1 21.1 1.6 0.33 12.4 20.8 1.3 0.40 15.0 21.2 1.7 0.29
(8) 24.0 14.1 22.7 -1.3 0.38 12.4 22.6 -1.4 0.45 15.0 22.5 -1.6 0.33
(9) 35.5 14.1 25.5 -10.0 0.45 12.4 26.8 -8.7 0.54 15.0 24.9 -10.6 0.40
(1) - No access; (2) - Dial-up (PT); (3) - ADSL (PT); (4) - Cable V1 (PT); (5) - Cable V2 (PT); (6) - Cable, pay as you go (PT); (7)
- Cable V1 (CV); (8) - Cable V2 (CV); (9) - Cable V3 (CV)
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Table 13: Changes in Consumer Welfare and Profits
Population ∆p† ∆pp ∆CS
‡ ∆ profit ‡
All Elast I -0.99 -0.10 0.51 -0.08
All Elast II -1.56 -0.15 0.64 -0.27
All Elast III -0.50 -0.05 0.54 -0.09
Broadband Elast I -2.58 -0.12 0.81 -0.00
Broadband Elast II -2.94 -0.14 0.97 -0.26
Broadband Elast III -1.80 -0.09 0.92 -0.02
Narrowband Elast I -0.32 -0.06 0.64 -0.08
Narrowband Elast II -0.85 -0.17 0.80 -0.01
Narrowband Elast III 0.07 0.01 0.71 -0.08
† Average; ‡ per household/month
Table 14: Estimated Elasticities - I (calibrated)
εij (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) si
(1) 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.658
(2) 0.00 -2.95 ** 0.60 0.43 0.06 0.28 0.18 0.39 0.01 0.14 ** 0.12 ** 0.04 ** 0.06 ** 0.08 0.06 0.022
(3) 0.00 0.03 -4.46 * 0.57 0.34 0.07 0.22 0.80 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.29*** 0.21***0.092
(4) 0.00 0.07 1.81 ** -5.39*** 0.23 0.16 0.27 0.77 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.25 ** 0.19 ** 0.036
(5) 0.00 0.01 1.99*** 0.40 -5.67*** 0.05 0.16 0.56 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.28*** 0.20***0.017
(6) 0.00 0.13 ** 0.83 0.52 0.09 -3.00 ** 0.21 0.46 0.01 0.13 ** 0.12 ** 0.04 ** 0.06 ** 0.12 0.09 0.040
(7) 0.00 0.07 1.78 ** 0.65 0.23 0.15 -5.79*** 0.95 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.25 ** 0.18 ** 0.015
(8) 0.00 0.05 1.87*** 0.56 0.24 0.10 0.28 * -5.20 ** 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.26*** 0.19***0.040
(9) 0.00 0.02 1.99*** 0.51 * 0.30 0.03 0.20 0.70 -6.41*** 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.28*** 0.20***0.003
(10) 0.00 0.14 ** 0.60 0.43 0.06 0.28 0.18 0.39 0.01 -2.95 ** 0.12 ** 0.04 ** 0.06 ** 0.08 0.06 0.022
(11) 0.00 0.14 ** 0.60 0.43 0.06 0.28 0.18 0.39 0.01 0.14 **-2.97 ** 0.04 ** 0.06 ** 0.08 0.06 0.019
(12) 0.00 0.14 ** 0.60 0.43 0.06 0.28 0.18 0.39 0.01 0.14 ** 0.12 **-3.05*** 0.06 ** 0.08 0.06 0.006
(13) 0.00 0.14 ** 0.60 0.43 0.06 0.28 0.18 0.39 0.01 0.14 ** 0.12 ** 0.04 ** -3.03 ** 0.08 0.06 0.009
(14) 0.00 0.03 2.06*** 0.57 0.34 0.07 0.22 0.80 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 -6.24*** 0.21***0.013
(15) 0.00 0.03 2.06*** 0.57 0.34 0.07 0.22 0.80 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.29***-6.31***0.009
(1) - No access; (2) - Dial-up (PT); (3) - ADSL (PT); (4) - Cable V1 (PT); (5) - Cable V2 (PT); (6) - Cable, pay as you go (PT);
(7) - Cable V1 (CV); (8) - Cable V2 (CV); (9) - Cable V3 (CV); (10) - Dial-up (Novis); (11) - Dial-up (IOL); (12) - Dial-up (ONI);
(13) - Dial-up (OTH); (14) - ADSL (NOVIS); (15) - ADSL (ONI)
The elasticity values correspond to the average over households.
”***”, ”**”, and ”*” mean that the estimate is significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively.
The null hypothesis is -1 for diagonal elements, and 0 for off-diagonal elements.
33
Table 15: Estimated Elasticities - IV (calibrated)
εij No access Narrowband Broadband si
No access 0.000 0.190 0.492 0.666
Narrowband 0.000 -2.231 2.819 0.077
Broadband 0.000 0.180 -2.122 0.257
Table 16: Estimated Elasticities - V (calibrated)
εij No access Narrowband ADSL Cable si
No access 0.000 0.190 0.046 0.374 0.666
Narrowband 0.000 -2.231 0.578 1.939 0.077
ADSL 0.000 0.071 -3.335 1.731 0.107
Cable 0.000 0.257 1.863 -3.882 0.150
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Table 17: Marginal Cost Estimates (calibrated)
Product p Nash ex-ante
Calib
(1)
(2) 5.0 2.1
(3) 29.4 17.6
(4) 19.8 12.1
(5) 35.0 12.1
(6) 6.2 2.6
(7) 19.5 18.0
(8) 24.0 18.0
(9) 35.5 18.0
(10) 5.0 3.1
(11) 5.0 3.2
(12) 5.0 3.2
(13) 5.0 3.2
(14) 29.4 24.1
(15) 29.4 24.2
(1) - No access; (2) - Dial-up (PT); (3) - ADSL (PT); (4) - Cable V1 (PT);
(5) - Cable V2 (PT); (6) - Cable, pay as you go (PT); (7) - Cable V1 (CV);
(8) - Cable V2 (CV); (9) - Cable V3 (CV); (10) - Dial-up (Novis); (11) -
Dial-up (IOL); (12) - Dial-up (ONI); (13) - Dial-up (OTH); (14) - ADSL
(Novis); (15) - ADSL (ONI)
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Table 18: Marginal Costs and Prices after Structural Separation assuming Nash ex-ante
(calibrated)
After Separation
Product Today Calib
p c p ∆p p−cp
(1)
(2) 5.0 2.1 3.7 -1.3 0.44
(3) 29.4 17.6 23.8 -5.6 0.26
(4) 19.8 12.1 18.0 -1.8 0.33
(5) 35.0 12.1 19.2 -15.8 0.37
(6) 6.2 2.6 5.6 -0.6 0.53
(7) 19.5 18.0 22.3 2.8 0.19
(8) 24.0 18.0 23.3 -0.8 0.23
(9) 35.5 18.0 25.6 -9.9 0.30
(10) 5.0 3.1 4.7 -0.3 0.33
(11) 5.0 3.2 4.8 -0.2 0.33
(12) 5.0 3.2 5.0 -0.0 0.35
(13) 5.0 3.2 4.9 -0.1 0.35
(14) 29.4 24.1 29.4 0.0 0.18
(15) 29.4 24.2 29.4 0.0 0.18
(1) - No access; (2) - Dial-up (PT); (3) - ADSL (PT); (4) - Cable V1 (PT); (5) - Cable V2 (PT); (6) - Cable, pay as you go (PT); (7)
- Cable V1 (CV); (8) - Cable V2 (CV); (9) - Cable V3 (CV); (10) - Dial-up (Novis); (11) - Dial-up (IOL); (12) - Dial-up (ONI); (13)
- Dial-up (OTH)
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Table 19: Changes in Consumer Welfare and Profits (calibrated)
Population ∆p† ∆pp
†
∆CS‡ ∆ profit ††
All Calib -2.73 -0.14 1.69 -0.37
Broadband Calib -3.37 -0.14 2.56 -0.32
Narrowband Calib -0.53 -0.11 2.12 -0.05
No access Calib 0.00 0.00 1.36 0.00
† Average amongst all with internet access; ‡ per household/month (includes
households with no access); †† per household/month amongst all with internet
access
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Figure 1: Histograms of demographic variables
Figure 2: Penetration Rates
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Figure 3: Market shares
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